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SHOULD ‘PUBLIC REASON’ DEVELOPED UNDER US
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE APPLY TO
AUSTRALIA?
KEITH THOMPSON*
Abstract
John Rawls’ idea of public reason holds that comprehensive doctrines including religion should not be
allowed a voice in the public square. Such ideas prevent society achieving that ‘overlapping consensus’
which is said to be a requirement for enduring peace and progress. However, the suggestion that some
ideas should be excluded from public debate is anti-democratic. This article reviews Rawls’ idea of
public reason’ against its US legal context and suggests it was a response to US Supreme Court decisions
concerning their First Amendment. Though our framers copied most of that clause into the Australian
Constitution, the High Court has interpreted it completely differently. The article concludes that Rawls’
idea of public reason does not fit in a Westminster democracy tied to parliamentary sovereignty rather
than judicial review.

I

INTRODUCTION

My proposition in this article is that the idea of ‘public reason’, most famously articulated by
John Rawls, is an American idea that does not wisely transfer to jurisdictions where the
establishment clause jurisprudence of the United States’ (‘US’) Supreme Court does not apply.
This article develops previous research which shows that the freedom to manifest or exercise
one’s religious beliefs (including religious speech) does not require that the state be completely
excluded from involvement in religion, as is the thrust of the US jurisprudence.1 Even countries
that respect and have been informed by the US prohibition on the establishment of religion by
the state,2 have not considered that the prohibition requires the exclusion of all religious
involvement in the public square or that an impermeable wall of separation must be erected
between church and state to prevent any reception of the ideas of one by the other. The
rejection of the American ‘complete separation’ idea is most obvious in European countries
with established churches which have implemented a version of free exercise that is consistent
with the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights
instruments. Australian jurisprudence also suggests that the prohibition of religious
establishment in the US Bill of Rights need not prevent natural and respectful religious exercise
and expression in the public square.

* Associate Professor and Associate Dean, University of Notre Dame Australia (Sydney campus). Many people
have helped me develop this paper. I am sure I will not remember them all, but among others I thank Rex Ahdar,
Nicholas Aroney, Iain Benson, Steve Chavura, Joel Harrison, Gabriel Moens, Patrick Parkinson, Hayden Ramsey
and Michael Stokes. They have helped me hone my thinking, detected glaring omissions and inconsistencies, and
clarified my thinking when I had not perfectly expressed what I felt. But as always, the errors that remain are my
own.
1
See for eg, Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, ‘Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?’ (2004) 49 McGill
Law Review 635.
2
Cole Durham and Brett Scharffs observe that ‘the US approach [to establishment] is not as unusual as some
believe, since a number of countries, such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, have constitutional provisions
that closely resemble the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution’. However, they observe (as will be
discussed below in relation to Australia) that ‘these [provisions] are often interpreted in quite different ways’: W
Cole Durham, Jr and Brett G Scharffs, Law and Religion, National, International, and Comparative Perspectives
(Aspen Publishers, 2010) 370.
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The reason for writing such an article in Australia is that there is an increasing demand from
the secular left that religious worship and expression be confined to private space and that
religious reasons for political decisions should be affirmatively excluded from debate in the
public square. That suggestion was most strongly put by Anna Crabb as she asserted that
during John Howard’s term as Prime Minister ‘the framing of the September 11 terrorist attacks
and the subsequent “war on terror” as a religious conflict’ had ‘weakened adherence to Rawls’
… liberal consensus’ that religious beliefs should be excluded from the public forum.3 But Ms
Crabb is not alone. Amanda Lohrey has written that Australia became less fair during John
Howard’s term as Prime Minister in part, because ‘churches ha[d] been markedly successful
… in lobbying for an economic agenda that is straightforwardly about maximizing government
funding of the churches’ own infrastructure’.4 Less scholarly contemporary examples of the
thinly veiled idea that religious ideas have no place in the public square include Tim Dick’s
Sydney Morning Herald assertion that religious freedom is “bigotry disguised as belief”,5
parroting a New York Times editorial on March 31, 20156 and a writer in the same newspaper
two weeks later opining that institutional religion is a sanctuary for homophobes who should
not be allowed to preach against homosexual practices.7
I set out my proposition in two parts. In relation to the first part of my writing (set out under
Part II below) I outline and discuss the development and current nature of US establishment
clause jurisprudence. My intention is not to criticise North American jurisprudence, but rather
to show that there are other versions of religious freedom which do not relegate religious
expression and exercise to private space. As the Australian establishment clause is almost
identical to the US establishment clause, l show that the form the words taken is not the
problem. In relation to the second part of my writing (set out under Part III below) I explain
how John Rawls’ idea of public reason is a product of the US establishment clause
jurisprudence’s concern to separate church and state. I identify how the meaning of the US
establishment clause has been developed in US Supreme Court cases. My reason for
identifying that developing meaning is to show that what John Rawls wrote and when he wrote
it was coloured by the changing US Supreme Court’s religious freedom orthodoxy. Like the
US Supreme Court, Rawls maintained that ‘liberty of conscience’ was sacred, even though he
ultimately concluded that the expression of religious ideas should be ‘voluntarily’ confined to
private places. I conclude that John Rawls’ idea of public reason is flawed because it accepts
as gospel, the US jurisprudential idea that true freedom of religion requires a version of state
neutrality that excludes all religious expression from the public square. The exclusion of
religious expression from the public square in US jurisprudence is dangerous because it
suppresses religious freedom. The idea of Public Reason is dangerous because it sends a
message that it is alright to suppress religious expression for reasons other than the risk of
significant harm in society. Current US religious freedom jurisprudence is inconsistent with
the religious freedom that is set out in international human rights instruments which better
respects religious diversity and expression. The contemporary US version of religious freedom
as limited by Rawls’ doctrine of public reason is not acceptable in common law jurisdictions
which hold that the legislature rather than the judges is sovereign. Nor is public reason
convincing in civil law jurisdictions where the existence of an established church remains
compatible with religious expression and manifestation in the public square. When the US
Anna Crabb, ‘Invoking Religion in Australian Politics’ (2009) 44(2) Australian Journal of Political Science 259,
260-61.
4
Amanda Lohrey, ‘Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia’, Quarterly Essay 22 (2006) 60, 63.
5
“Comment”, Sydney Morning Herald, May 26, 2015.
6
“Religion as a cover for bigotry”, in Editorials/Letters, The New York Times, A22.
7
“Same-sex sinners”, Bruni F, The New York Times Sunday Review, April 5, 2015, 3.
3
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establishment clause ideology is extracted from Rawls’ idea of public reason, public reason
can be identified as an anti-democratic Trojan horse with the potential to neuter the views of
up to 4/5th of the world’s population in favour of a non-believing elite. As the anti-democratic
nature of Rawls’ idea of public reason is exposed, its respectability and convincing power
should fade.

II US ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment to the US Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.

The first two clauses deal what is now called freedom of religion. The first of those clauses is
known as the establishment clause and the second as the free exercise clause. Both clauses have
been the subject of considerable litigation since they were adopted in December 1791. Because
both clauses limit US federal government action, most of that litigation has been brought by
private individuals claiming that federal government legislation has unlawfully established
religion or interfered with religious practice. After the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in
1868 following the Civil War, succeeding panels of the US Supreme Court have confirmed
that the restrictions imposed by the First Amendment on government legislation applied also
to the US state governments.8
There are many US cases about the establishment clause. Though I acknowledge the extensive
debate about that Clause in the Bill of Rights that has been fought using the ‘original intent’ of
the framers as a weapon, I will not engage in that debate. My purpose below is to identify what
the US Supreme Court has said concerning what the establishment clause means in the past
and in the present.
The first case that directly engaged the US establishment clause concerned whether federal
funding to build an isolating ward or building at the Providence hospital in Rhode Island,
breached the Constitution.9 The Supreme Court observed that though the hospital was operated
by the Catholic Church, it had been established by an Act of Congress and Congress retained
authority to direct its staff regardless of their religious commitments. Two-thirds of the
capacity of the proposed new building was reserved for the use of poor persons sent by the
District and those patients would choose their own physicians and nurses at the cost of the
District. As the hospital had a secular purpose, it did not conflict with the First Amendment.
Before the Civil War, it had been clear that the clauses of the First Amendment did not bind
the states. They prohibited the US federal government from establishing religion or passing
laws that interfered with citizens’ free exercise, but did not stop the states establishing churches
or proscribing free exercise. But the Fourteenth Amendment passed after the Civil War in
1868, extended the reach of the Bill of Rights into the states though the extent of that reach was
not defined in respect of the religion clauses in the First Amendment until the decisions reached
8

In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940), the US Supreme Court held that by virtue of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the US states were also bound by the free exercise clause. In Everson v
Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), the Court similarly found that the establishment clause also applied to the
states.
9
Bradfield v Roberts, 175 US 291 (1899).
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in 194010 and 1947.11 In 1940, the Supreme Court found that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protected free exercise as a ‘quintessential individual right’.12 But the
establishment clause did not directly engage individual rights and had originally been drafted
only to prevent the federal government from interfering with the state religious establishments
that existed when the federal Bill of Rights was passed in 1789.
But in Everson v Board of Education in 1947 that limited view of the scope of the establishment
clause was fundamentally changed. Though the Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey statute
which funded student transportation to all schools whether they were religious or not, when he
wrote the 5-4 majority judgment, Justice Hugo Black famously changed the establishment
clause landscape by insisting that the establishment clause required the separation of church
and state, invoking President Thomas Jefferson in aid of the proposition:
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State’.13

The debate concerning the meaning and authority of Jefferson’s words has raged ever since.
Critics have shown that Madison rather than Jefferson was the most prominent author of the
final version of the First Amendment.14 But it is clear that in other writings, Madison
acknowledged at least, the need to separate the ecclesiastical and civil spheres to prevent their
mutually corrupting influence.15 The separation argument has antecedents dating back at least
to the ‘two swords’ theory that Pope Gregory VII used in 12th century Europe to ‘settle’ the
investiture controversy.16 Whatever the rights or wrongs of the ‘separation is necessary’
argument, Justice Black’s words struck a chord that has continued to resonate in US
jurisprudence. Arguably, Justice Black’s generous interpretation of the meaning of the
10

Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940).
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947).
12
Michael W McConnell, John H Garvey and Thomas C Berg, Religion and the Constitution (Aspen Law and
Business, 2002) 88.
13
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947).
14
For example, when former US Chief Justice William H Rehnquist was first an Associate Justice, he delivered
a dissenting opinion in Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38, 91 (1985) where he rewrote the Everson interpretation of
the establishment clause written 38 years previously. He began his criticism with the statement that ‘[i]t is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but
unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor [‘a
wall of separation between church and state’] for nearly forty years’: at 92.
15
Koppelman has detailed Madison’s concern that religion should not be promoted simply because it conduces to
good citizenship and that ‘to employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy’ was ‘an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation’: Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, Northwestern
University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory No 08-32, 4, 25-26, 66
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268406>.
16
Berman says the terms ‘Investiture Struggle’ to describe the contests between the Church and States in the 11 th
and 12th centuries is something of an understatement. The transformation involved was much more revolutionary
than that term implies and sought the complete ‘disengagement of the sacred and profane spheres’: Harold J
Berman, Law and Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1983) 87-88. Brian Tierney dates the idea of the ‘two
swords’ to Bernard of Clairvaux in the middle of the 12th century: Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State
1050-1300 (Prentice-Hall, 1964) 87-88.
11
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establishment clause in 1947 was the watershed from which the constitutional invalidity of
public school prayer began to flow in 1962. That jurisprudence is note-worthy. Since 1962,17
public school prayer and anything similar18 or substituted for it19 has been unconstitutional.
And although the jurisprudence surrounding official sponsorship of Christmas nativity20 and
other public displays is more equivocal,21 it was a public display case that led to Justice
O’Connor’s ruling that any government endorsement of a practice or event which led a
participant to feel a sense of otherness or exclusion, would offend the establishment clause
prohibition.22
In 1971, Justice Black’s interpretation of the establishment clause morphed into the ‘excessive
entanglement’ test that came out of the decision in Lemon v Kurtman.23 The idea that secular
government laws which were ‘excessively entangled’ in religion were constitutionally invalid,
and the related ideas that no law was valid which had neither a secular purpose nor a primary
secular effect, have become the touchstones to which most US judges refer when deciding what
the establishment clause means.
Attempts to moderate the rigour of those judicial tests have not been completely unsuccessful.
Justice O’Connor’s compromise idea in Lynch v Donnelly24 that it was state endorsement of
religion that made non-religious believers feel like outsiders that constitutionally invalidated
state laws, has appealed to some judges because it is not as unyielding as the idea that any
religious idea in a law should invalidate it. But the suggestion that a scintilla of state
endorsement of a religious idea in any law should invalidate it, still operates as a veto in the
hands of a judge trained to believe that the establishment clause requires absolute separation of
church and state. The competing judgments handed down on June 27, 200525 suggest the
Supreme Court Justices do not want the establishment clause to work as a black and white veto
on the constitutionality of a law that has even the whiff of anything religious about it. But the
argument that only a public display that has more than fifty years standing will survive judicial
review said by some commentators to explain the difference in these two 2005 decisions,26 is
17

Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
For example, the mandatory reading of the Lord’s Prayer was struck down in Abington School District v
Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).
19
In Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985), the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law enabling a daily period
of silence in schools which students could use for private prayers.
20
A nativity display or crèche was held not to breach the establishment clause in Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668
(1984), but a similar display breached the establishment prohibition in the clause in Allegheny County v Greater
Pittsburgh, ACLU 492 US 573 (1989).
21
Two Ten Commandments cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same day were similarly decided
differently in 2005. In Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005), the display at the Texas state capitol was upheld
because it had a secular purpose. But in McCreary County v ACLU or Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005), displays in
several Kentucky county courthouses were unconstitutional because they were not integrated into an overall
secular purpose.
22
Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984).
23
403 US 602 (1971).
24
465 US 668 (1984).
25
Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005) and McCreary County v ACLU or Kentucky, 545 US 844 (2005). For
a brief summary of their findings, see above n 15.
26
Some have suggested that the two decisions may be reconciled by the Supreme Court’s earlier finding in Marsh
v Chambers, 463 US 783, 786 (1983) that some government practices are permissible ‘because they are deeply
imbedded in the history and tradition of this country’. See for eg, John Witte Jr and Joel A Nichols, Religion and
the American Constitutional Experiment (Westview Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 229-31. See also Matthew J Morrison,
‘The Van Orden and McCreary County Cases: Closing the Gaps Remaining between the Established Lines of Ten
Commandments Jurisprudence’, (2007) 13 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 435,
noting the ‘history and tradition’ reconciliation of the two decisions but suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s
18
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not philosophically satisfying. Nor is the logic of those two decisions consistent with
international free exercise norms though they may explain why some overtly religious practices
and symbols have thus far survived judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.27
What is most unsatisfying about the current state of US First Amendment jurisprudence is that
it seems internally inconsistent to those familiar with freedom of religion under international
human rights instruments. That is because the establishment clause jurisprudence seems to
compete with the idea of free exercise expressed in the immediately following sister clause.
The free exercise clause is also expressed as a prohibition – ‘Congress … shall make no law
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ – so that US legislatures are not obliged to protect
freedom of religion in the manner set out in modern international human rights instruments.
The US free exercise clause only prevents US legislatures passing laws which would interfere
with the free exercise of religion. But if the interpretation of the two religion clauses was evenhanded, one would expect indirect legislative interference with free exercise to be as proscribed
as indirect legislative establishment. That is, just as legislation that indirectly endorses a
religious practice or idea is routinely struck down, one would expect even-handed judges to
strike down a law that indirectly interferes with some manifestation of religion that does not
hurt anyone. But that is not the way the US jurisprudence works. It is not that American
lawyers have missed this inconsistency. It took centre stage in Walz v Tax Commission in
197028 when the Court decided 7:1 that religious tax exemptions did not breach the
establishment clause. Chief Justice Burger wrote that ‘absolutely straight line … rigidity could
defeat the basic purpose’29 of the two religion clauses. The general principle that he ‘deduc[ed]
from the First Amendment’30 was that the Court would ‘not tolerate either governmentally
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of th[e]se expressly
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.’31
That Chief Justice Burger’s ‘play in the joints’ metaphor identified that the two religion clauses
are ‘frequently in tension’32 and need to be balanced, is manifest in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
more recent understanding that ‘room for play in the joints between [the clauses meant that] …
there are some state actions permitted by the establishment clause but not required by the free
exercise clause’.33 But this formulation of the tension also manifests that free exercise
considerations are likely to come off second best in such a balancing exercise since the Court
has not developed inviolable Lemon tests to determine Free Exercise constitutional validity. If
either Chief Justice Burger or Chief Justice Rehnquist had seen the two religion clauses as in
any way equal in this balance, then government interference in religious practice that was
‘coercion test’ expounded in Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992) is a more philosophically satisfying way to
reconcile the two decisions. But others have suggested these transparently divergent decisions manifest a rupture
in the uneasy détente between the conservative and liberal blocks in the Supreme Court which had been respected
for many years (for eg, Laura S Underkuffler, ‘Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers
of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence’, (2006) 5 First Amendment Law Review 5.
27
The US Pledge of Allegiance has survived so far despite the decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v
Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004). The religious inscriptions chiseled into Supreme Court stone, the religious prayers
which open legislative sittings in many US jurisdictions, and the ‘In God we trust’ words on US currency are also
alive and well as at this writing.
28
397 US 664 (1970).
29
Ibid 669.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Locke v Davey, 540 US 712, 718-719 (2004).
33
Ibid.
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privately motivated would have been a larger constitutional problem. And it certainly was not
a problem when student initiated prayer was struck down under the establishment clause in
Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe.34 Absent such equality between the clauses, the
benevolent neutrality to which Chief Justice Burger said the Court aspires, presents as an
illusory tease.35
A

The Establishment of Religion Does Not Offend
International Religious Freedom Norms

The first point to be made in this discussion is that the US idea that the establishment of religion
is inconsistent with human rights norms, does not appear in any international human rights
instrument.36 Indeed, as John Witte Jr has observed, ‘[i]nternational law and many domestic
laws regard the material and moral cooperation of church and state as conducive, and
sometimes essential, to the achievement of religious liberty’.37 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh
develop John Witte’s insight further by observing that ‘[i]nternational treaties and covenants
are worded in free exercise terms only’38 and that ‘the more radical demands for separationism
reified in the American “wall of separation” metaphor’39 are ‘conspicuous[ly] absent’40 from
international norms. They continue that the classic Krishnaswami Report ‘concluded that it was
impossible to recommend a particular form of judicial relationship between the state and
religion’.41
Durham and Scharffs have similarly concluded that there is no one correct or safe structural
model that provides optimum religious freedom in any society.42 There are many countries
with established churches that do very well in supporting the religious freedom of all their
subjects even when there is an established state church.43 For Ahdar and Leigh, ‘neither
establishment of religion, nor formal separation of state and religion, would in themselves
constitute religious intolerance or discrimination’44 under either the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 1996 (‘ICCPR’) or the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All

34

530 US 290 (2000).
In Canada, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of that country’s Supreme Court has warned that leaving questions about
the bounds of freedom of religious practice to judicial discretion and case-by-case analysis – ‘balancing’ in the
US First Amendment jurisprudence above - has a ‘chilling effect’ on religious freedom generally. She said that
religion and spirituality prosper best when the legal rules are certain and predictable: R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR
263,
36
Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 658.
37
John Witte Jr, ‘Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment’ (1996)
71 Notre Dame Law Review 371, 440.
38
Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 657.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid. Ahdar and Leigh attribute this description of Krishnaswami Report to Brice Dickson (‘The United Nations
and Freedom of Religion’ (1995) 44 International Comparative Law Quarterly 327, 344). These opinions of the
Krishnaswami Report are shared by Bahiyyih G Tahzib in her book, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring
Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) 131-32, where she cites various
commentators who have described the Report as ‘careful and comprehensive’ and a ‘landmark’ in the United
Nations’ ‘efforts … to eradicate prejudice and discrimination based on religion or belief”.
42
Durham and Scharffs, above n 2, 112-62.
43
Ibid.
44
Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 659 citing Donna J Sullivan, ‘Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination’ (1988) 82 American Journal
of International Law 487, 490. See also, Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 658-59.
35
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Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (‘Elimination of
Religious Intolerance Declaration’).45
The bottom line is that the US First Amendment prohibition on the federal establishment of
religion was required in 1789 to protect the US Bill of Rights from a veto by the six US states
that then did have established churches. This clause in the First Amendment was intended to
protect American pluralism perhaps on the basis of Voltaire’s popular insight that:
If there were only one religion in England there would be danger of despotism, if there were two, they
would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and happiness. 46

Certainly the 21st century US understanding of the First Amendment is different, but
international practice and American history confirm that the separation of church and state are
not essential to the satisfactory settlement of religious freedom in any society. Australian
experience makes this insight even more clear since the Australian framers copied the
American religion clauses almost word for word into their 1901 Constitution.47
Section 116 of the Australian Constitution reads:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious
observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as
a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.

Even though the two clauses are very similar, the High Court of Australia has found that the
replacement of the US word ‘respecting’ with the word ‘for’ by the Australian framers, means
that the Australian clause is significantly narrower than its American template. The facts in
Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (‘DOGS case’)48 which elicited this
stark difference in approach concerned school funding in the State of Victoria. In a relator
action, the applicants argued that the federal government’s funding of religious schools was a
breach of the establishment clause of the Australian Constitution quoted above using logic
lifted straight out of the US cases.49 They lost 6:1 with only Murphy J accepting that the US
jurisprudence should be followed.50 The majority did not accept Murphy J’s proposition that
the different interpretation of the changed wording in the Australian Constitution was ‘hair45

ICCPR, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976);
Elimination of Religious Intolerance Declaration, GA Res 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp (No 51), 36th sess, 73rd
plen mtg, arts 1–8, UN Doc A/36/684 (1981). See also Universal Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’), GA
Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).
46
Voltaire, 6th Philosophical Letter, 1734.
47
Durham and Scharffs, above n 2, 370 where they note that Japan and the Philippines have also followed US
establishment clause ideology for their constitutions.
48
(1981) 146 CLR 559. Note however, that the Australian approach is very close to that which Associate Justice
Rehnquist wished to take in his dissenting judgment in Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 91 (1985).
49
DOGS case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 578.
50
Murphy J was emphatic - ‘The United States’ decision on the establishment clause should be followed. The
arguments for departing from them (based on trifles of differences in wording between the United States and
Australian establishment clauses) are hair-splitting, and not consistent with the broad general approach which
should be taken to constitutional guarantees of freedom’: ibid 632). But his brethren steadfastly rejected his
argument that the Australian jurisprudence should be followed by what the US Supreme Court had already
decided. Barwick CJ said simply that the Australian constitutional language was always controlling: ibid 578.
Wilson J was stronger, citing Gibbs J (in the earlier case of Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The
Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 28 ALR 257, 270) where he had said that ‘although we regard the decisions
of the Supreme Court with the greatest respect, it must never be forgotten that they are often give against a different
constitutional, legal and social background from that which exists in Australia’: ibid 652.
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splitting’.51 Chief Justice Barwick said that the Australian words prohibited ‘the making of a
law for establishing a religion’.52 Despite the contrary interpretation of the US First
Amendment words, there was no ambiguity53 in the purposive Australian language.54 Gibbs J
said that it was ‘impossible to say … that the challenged legislation has the purpose or effect
of setting up any religion or religious body as a state religion or a state church’.55 Stephen J
said that he thought ‘“establishing” mean[t] the constituting of a religion as an officially
recognized State religion’.56 Gibbs and Stephen JJ both rejected Murphy J’s propositions that
the US First Amendment forbade the funding of religious education by the time that the
Australian Constitution was enacted57 and that s 116 of the Australian Constitution must
therefore have been intended to enact the same prohibition.58 Stephen and Wilson JJ also
rejected Murphy J’s acceptance of the plaintiffs’ argument that section 116 constituted a rights
guarantee of some kind.59 They said it only operated as a prohibition on Commonwealth
legislative power.60 In consequence of the fact that section 116 was not a rights guarantee,
Wilson J also rejected Murphy J’s assertion that because section 116 involved a constitutional
guarantee of the rights of the states and the citizens, it should be interpreted in broad general
terms.61 Wilson J said that while it was true that ‘constitutional grant[s] of plenary power
should be construed with all the generality which the words used will admit … the same [wa]s
not true of a provision which proscribes power’.62
Wilson J read s 116 as ‘forbidding any law for establishing any religion or any form of any
religion.63 But Mason J’s interpretation of the Australian establishment clause was the
narrowest of all. He agreed with Wilson J, but qualified further and added:
[T]o constitute ‘establishment’ of a ‘religion’ the concession to one church of favours, titles and
advantages must be of so special a kind that it enables us to say that by virtue of the concession the
religion has become established as a national institution, as, for example, by becoming the official
religion of the state.64

The lowest common denominator of these five separate majority judgments (including one by
the serving Chief Justice of Australia and two from future Chief Justices of Australia), is that
the words ‘shall not make any law for establishing any religion’ do not prevent anything other
than the establishment of a national church or religion. This reasoning stands in sharp contrast
to the equivalent authority of Justice Hugo Black’s assertion in the United States that very
similar words mean a lot more than that in the US,65 suggesting at least that Australia and the
US are another two countries ‘separated’ by a common language.66
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Two of the Australian High Court judges also considered that the Australian establishment
clause could not represent a mandate for state-church separation since that broad general
reading of the clause would have made the third and fourth clauses of s 116 of the Australian
Constitution redundant.67 While the US First Amendment does not contain similar clauses
prohibiting the enforcement of any religious observance or the imposition of religious tests for
public offices or trusts, similar prohibitions do exist elsewhere in the US Bill of Rights68 –
meaning that these Australian High Court judges seem to deny that even the broader words of
the US First Amendment required the separationist meaning given them in US Supreme Court
jurisprudence.69
However, a comparison of the US and Australian establishment clause language is incomplete
if we just look at the judgments. There also has to be an understanding that the jurisprudential
differences between the two countries are not just about the words the different framers chose
to express their restrictions on federal government involvement in religion in the future. There
are cultural overlays that are beyond the scope of this paper, but there are also different judicial
conventions which are not accounted for in the foregoing comparison.
Foremost among those is the different approach that judges in the US and Australia take to
judicial review. Ever since Marbury v Madison70 was decided in the US, US judges have been
authorised to strike down federal (and later state) legislation that offended the Constitution
including the Bill of Rights which became a part of that Constitution by virtue of the first Ten
Amendments. Australian judges cannot do that. For one thing, Australia has no federal
constitutional bill of rights so that the ambit of the High Court’s power to review legislation
for consistency with the Constitution is more limited than it is for the US Supreme Court. And
secondly, there is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which holds that Parliament, rather
than the courts, have the final say as to what the law shall be by virtue of their electoral mandate.
Certainly the High Court of Australia can declare federal legislation invalid if it is beyond the
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact it, but no Australian court can strike down
legislation because it is incompatible with human rights values unless a plaintiff or appellant
can point to those values in the express words or necessary implications of the Australian
Constitution itself.71 And referenda results are much more difficult if not impossible to unsettle
because they are the ultimate primary evidence of popular intent.

Though this international discussion demonstrates that the US Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is unique, it also shows that jurisdictions outside the US do not accept that the
prohibition of religious establishment and the separation of church and state are a requirement
for religious freedom in any nation. This insight serves as an appropriate introduction to the
philosophical thought of John Rawls about religious freedom that follows. It is a premise of
67
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this article, that John Rawls was raised in a legal and philosophical environment that accepted
without question, that church and state must be separated and religious establishment forbidden
if religious liberty was to prosper. Rawls does not anywhere overtly state his acceptance or
belief in that proposition. But it is the premise of this article that Rawls accepted it as ‘the
gospel’ without critical analysis. Part II of this article will therefore outline Rawls’ thought,
drawing attention to this ‘assumption proposition’ only when necessary to identify and test it.

III THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN RAWLS:
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)
Rawls' Theory of Justice grew out of his concern that utilitarian ideas could not produce a just
society.72 He believed that because all competent human beings share an innate sense of
justice,73 it was possible to conceive and create a truly just society.74 The utilitarian aspiration
to create a system that provided 'the greatest good to the greatest number' suppressed minority
interests completely and that does not feel naturally just to anyone. Rawls suggested that most
of us would come to the same conclusions about what constitutes a just society, if we made
those decisions behind a 'veil of ignorance' from an 'original position'. 75 Those conclusions
would not be utilitarian.76 Rawls says that the political and legal system we would choose from
the neutral vantage point of his 'original position' would be just and fair. We would choose the
best option if we did not know even generally what our particular circumstances would be
when we had our turn on earth.77 An enlightened theoretical self-interest would displace the
practical self-interest that drives existing human societies in the present.78 Rawls believed that
the systems we would all innately choose from behind his veil of ignorance in the original
position, would yield fairness to all and not just to the majority, as in utilitarian philosophy, or
to oligarchical power elites as feared in marxist philosophy.79 If the answers human beings
seek to questions of law and practice were worked out from the perspective of the original
position, we could edge our way towards a truly just society in the present.
Rawls did not think religious groups were any more trustworthy than other majoritarian or elite
groups wielding power in human society.80 History was full of examples where religious
72
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groups suppressed others as soon as they acquired the reins of power despite their 'golden rule'
pretensions. That concern with human self-interest saw Rawls discuss the place of tolerance
in connection with freedom of conscience and speech in A Theory of Justice, long before he
articulated his idea of public reason.
Since people in the original position, ‘do not know ... what their religious or moral convictions
are ... [t]he question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the
liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral and philosophical
interests.’81 He concluded quite simply that
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge.
They cannot take their chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine
to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes. 82

Rawls discussed whether it is just for parents or other ancestors to choose equal liberty of
conscience on behalf of their descendants, and concluded that since persons in the original
position know no ‘more about their descendants than they know about themselves’,83 their
decisions are just even if they bind all generations. But equal liberty of conscience is not
absolute. It ‘is limited...by the common interest in public order and security’84 since from the
original position, each would recognize ‘that the disruption of [public order and security] is a
danger for the liberty of all’.85 He also denied ‘the notion of the omnicompetent laicist state,
since from the principles of justice it follows that government has neither the right nor the duty
to do what it or a majority ... wants to do in questions of morals and religion.’86 Even though
‘an intolerant sect has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty’87 since it cannot
claim reciprocal treatment88 if it would not accord such treatment, ‘[w]e still cannot say that
tolerant sects have the right to suppress the [intolerant].’89 That someone is ‘intolerant of
another is [not] grounds for limiting someone's liberty’.90 While ‘[j]ustice does not require that
men stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence’, ‘when the constitution itself
is secure, there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant’.91 The only reason why the
denial of such freedom could be justified was if ‘this is necessary for the sake of equal liberty
itself’92 as for example when the constitution was not secure.93 The need to preserve equal
liberty itself was the only principle which could justly limit equal liberty of conscience. Rawls

centuries [honored] ... the principle of toleration ... only as a modus vivendi. This meant that should either party
fully gain its way it would impose its own religious doctrine as the sole admissible faith.’
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believed that all would agree to this limiting principle from the standpoint of the original
position.94
In Rawls’ Theory of Justice, there is no obvious US establishment clause paradigm of thought
evident.95 What he wrote there about equal liberty of conscience is consistent with both the
conception of freedom of religion in US First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and
in international human rights instruments including the UDHR, the ICCPR and the Elimination
of Religious Intolerance Declaration though he did not mention any of those documents.
How did Rawls get from such a generally acceptable expression of the idea of freedom of
conscience and belief to the idea that some expressions of belief were inappropriate in the
public square even though they represented no threat to equal liberty itself? How did he justify
the abrogation of freedom of conscience and belief that seems implicit to so many in his idea
of ‘public reason’?
Rawls’ idea of ‘public reason’ was developed in his theoretical quest for an overlapping
consensus such as might stabilise and strengthen all liberal democracies. It was first proposed
in his 1993 book entitled Political Liberalism96 and further developed in his 1999 article
entitled ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’.97 He saw these new works as a continuation of
what he had written in A Theory of Justice. ‘In a nearly just society there is a public acceptance
of the same principles of justice’.98 But there does not need to be complete agreement. There
can even be ‘considerable differences in citizen's conceptions of justice provided that these
conceptions all lead to similar political judgments’.99 ‘[D]ifferent premises can yield the same
conclusion’100 and therefore groups with different perspectives can accept the same judgment
in a dispute though for different reasons. However, ‘there comes a point beyond which the
requisite agreement in judgment breaks down and society splits...on fundamental questions’.101
Responsible citizens will not then do as they please. While they may act conscientiously and
disobey law, yet they will be held responsible for what they do.102 Citizens responding to such
differences should sacrifice their comprehensive doctrines in the interests of preserving the
overlapping consensus necessary to preserve society when viewed from the original position.
To use Rawls' own words:
Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of
their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons
they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake. I propose that
in Public Reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. 103
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For Rawls, equal liberty of conscience was not compromised by this citizen sacrifice of those
parts of their comprehensive doctrines which lie outside the overlapping consensus, because it
was a voluntary sacrifice made in the interests of the peaceful and secure continuation of their
society. It was also justified because it was a reciprocal sacrifice made by all citizens in the
interests of the greater good.104 This sacrifice or mutual forbearance,105 was a citizen ‘duty of
civility’106 but for Rawls, it was a moral duty rather than a legal duty. 107 Comprehensive
doctrines, including religious doctrines, may only enter political debate, if they are ‘proper
political reasons’108 and manifest ‘commitment to constitutional democracy’.109 In
demonstration of the neutrality of his concept of Public Reason, Rawls says that secular
arguments premised in ‘a worthy idea of full human good’ are no more acceptable in the public
square than religious arguments. Thus statutes forbidding homosexual relations may only be
discussed in terms of the relevant civil rights rather than whether they are good, or bad or
sinful110 – though it is unclear from Rawls' text why the moral quality of homosexual relations
is not something upon which one could have an opinion in the original position.111
Some colleagues have suggested that my characterisation of Rawls’ understanding of liberty
of conscience is unjust because I infer that he abandoned liberty of conscience as a sacrificial
lamb on an altar of overlapping consensus. I do not think Rawls believed he was sacrificing
liberty of conscience at all. Rawls believed that all he wrote preserved liberty of conscience.
My point is that his US context blinded him, at least in part, to an understanding that his
‘proviso’ in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ substantially undermined liberty of
conscience as understood in international human rights instruments. In his own words:
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely
by comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive
doctrines are said to support.112

Rawls’ belief that there is a need to justify comprehensive doctrines including religious
comprehensive religious doctrines with “proper political reasons” misunderstands and
diminishes freedom of speech including freedom of religious speech, as well as liberty of
conscience. It misunderstands both freedoms because it infers that they are not self-evident. It
diminishes them because it requires them to justify themselves in a better language even though
true freedom is allowed to speak for itself. I elaborate upon these and other objections to
Rawls’ idea of public reason in the next two sections of this article.
104
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A

Some Criticism that Suggests Rawlsian Public Reason Does Not Respect
Free Religious Speech

When Rawls revisited his idea of public reason in 1997, he did not believe it compromised the
equal liberty of conscience that he had outlined in his Theory of Justice in 1971. Before I
review Rawls’ belief that his idea of public reason is consistent with his own 1971 explanation
of what is meant by equal liberty of conscience, I outline some of the general criticisms to
which Rawls’ idea of public reason has been subject. Thereafter, I seek to unpack the question
of whether his idea of public reason demonstrates that his conception of equal liberty of
conscience has been tainted by US establishment clause jurisprudence.
Rawls’ idea of public reason has been the subject of significant criticism because many
consider that it does not adequately respect free religious speech. Jeremy Waldron has said
that most representations of religious arguments in the public square are crude caricatures and
are unfavourably compared with the elegant complexity of the philosophical theories of Rawls
and Dworkin.113 But these characterisations are mostly a travesty114 and understanding those
arguments can and should deepen and enrich our understanding of equality as well as ‘our
sense of what it is like to make a religious argument in politics’.115 Indeed, ‘it may be
impossible to articulate certain important egalitarian commitments without appealing to what
one takes to be their religious grounds. If so the Rawlsian exclusion seems unreasonable’.116
And this writer adds, unreasonable not only on the ground that it excludes important
contributions from the debate, but unreasonable because it unjustly excludes some citizens
from contributing their expertise to the debate at all.117 Waldron is also concerned in
consequence that ‘basic equality is now under attack by sophisticated bodies of theory, which
have as their aim the establishment of political power on an inegalitarian basis.’118
John Finnis is vaguely charitable when he attributes Rawls' exclusion of ‘certain kinds of true
and philosophically warranted propositions ... from the processes of public deliberation ... on
the grounds that they are not sufficiently widely accepted.’119 Finnis says Rawls' arguments
are equivocal, arbitrary, clumsy and ramshackle.120 He continues, citing Eisgruber and Sager's
book, Religious Freedom and the Constitution:121
They have no time for Rawlsian proposals to expel from the public domain all religious arguments or
grounds for decision-making; they share ... Dworkin's (and Joseph Raz's) healthy skepticism about that
ramshackle Rawlsian project – he calls it 'political liberalism' – which in all really important decisions
about human rights and the common good would banish concern for truth and in its place put an
imaginary overlapping consensus of the 'reasonable' views of all 'reasonable' people (views supposedly
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identifiable as reasonable without reflection on their truth). They hold – rightly, I think – that in these
matters neutrality is not an option.122

Steven Smith criticises what he calls ‘the secular government position’123 espoused by Rawls
among others, which he says would interpret the US Constitution to render 'religious' interests
illegitimate.124 Smith’s concern is that it is frequently impossible in practice to distinguish
between what is and is not supposed to be illegitimate because religious ideas and reasons are
laced through so many issues in American politics. His hypothetical example from Kent
Greenawalt, which he says ‘blends a bit of Noah and a whiff of Nostradamus’,125 suggests this
reasoning would make it illegitimate for government to make secular preparations for a flood
if lobbied to do so by religionists, but not if that view were expressed by climate change
specialists with scientific evidence to back it up.126 He then discusses three different kinds of
‘goods’ to try and work out whether it would be illegitimate for a politically liberal government
to promote them.127 Two are unmistakably religious – the 'Christian idea that it is good to be
saved', and the 'idea that obedience to God' is good128 - and a third more secular idea that a life
focused on family is better than a life spent guzzling beer on the couch watching NASCAR or
cage wrestling.129 But even the first two overtly religious ideas have their ethical counterparts
when non-religious people express what Professor Edward Rubin calls a ‘morality of selffulfillment’ as distinct from the older religious ‘morality of higher purpose’,130 or when they
agree that any instruction which encourages obedience to law is good for society.
Professor Smith's questions are – ‘is [there] a set of “interests” – end, or goods – that are off
limits to government because the goods themselves are “religious” in nature[?]’131 - and how
do you tell and who tells the difference? His conclusion is that making judgments of this kind
seems to involve government decisions of ‘exactly the kind ... that the American adoption of
religious freedom was meant to repudiate.’132 While
prominent thinkers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin sometimes suggest that government must be
neutral with respect to ‘the good’ or ‘the good life … neither American constitutional law nor American
political practice embrace this sort of restriction. On the contrary ... a good deal of political and
governmental activity is devoted precisely to the effort to express, ascertain and implement the citizens'
views about what makes for a good life (or good lives) and a good society. 133

These three writers are not satisfied that limiting public debate to the language of Public Reason
does not abrogate or limit freedom of speech, conscience and belief. But theirs are not the only
concerns. Other concerns include the idea that Public Reason discriminates against the
uneducated in society; is coercive or intolerant of ideas which are not programmed with its
122
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paradigm; and that the voluntary limitation of the language of public debate is not justified by
equal liberty itself. This last unanswered concern is ironic since in A Theory of Justice in 1971,
Rawls restated seven times between pages 186 and 188134 that the only justification for the
abrogation of any freedom was the risk that the exercise of that freedom might place freedom
itself in clear and present danger.
Briefly stated, the discrimination criticism is that the less educated in society are unlikely to
have the confidence and vocabulary to express themselves in the language of public reason and
so will be marginalised in a society where debate is limited in any way. Uneducated religious
believers may be even more marginalised by public reason since they have the double hurdles
of vocabulary and translation to surmount before their views will be considered in the public
square. That result is surprising since Rawls went to such trouble in A Theory of Justice to
explain why the intolerant should still be tolerated except when the constitution was under
threat.135
The coercion criticism is that equal liberty of conscience as expressed in A Theory of Justice,
cannot coexist with the voluntary and self-disciplined limitation of speech which Rawls called
for in his idea of Public Reason. That is because, in the original position, no one would ‘take
chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute
or to suppress [it]’.136 The difficulty in avoiding the dominance of any single religious or moral
doctrine, acknowledged in A Theory of Justice,137 counsels that we not narrow the quest for
overlapping consensus so much that we would ‘ask [religious believers] to recognize us as the
proper interpreter of their religious duties or moral obligations’.138
Rawls’ idea of public reason creates the sense that he grew less patient as he grew older. The
hope that good or best theory would triumph in the marketplace of ideas as the invisible hand
worked its magic à la Milton139 and Adam Smith,140 was replaced with an agenda that insisted
on an overlapping consensus come what may, though Rawls himself never used the language
of coercion or revolution. Though Rawls never admitted it, many commentators since141 have
observed that coercion was latent in Political Liberalism142 and ‘The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited’.143
Though Rawls believed that his idea of Public Reason did not compromise the equal liberty of
conscience that he had outlined in his Theory of Justice in 1971, the discussion above suggests
there are inconsistencies. These inconsistencies and the question whether they are attributable
in any measure to US establishment clause jurisprudence is discussed below.
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B

Inconsistencies between Rawlsian Public Reason
and Equal Liberty of Conscience

The foregoing discussion suggests that public reason is inconsistent with Rawls’ own
conception of equal liberty of conscience for at least, the following six reasons. First, in taking
up Jeremy Waldron’s point, that because Rawls does not understand religious reasons his
descriptions of those reasons are caricatures of them.144 When a person is committed to
religious values, she lives those values in every aspect of her life. Her values are part of her
human character and dignity. Her religious beliefs explain every decision she makes. Every
time she encounters a legal or a political issue in the public square, she understands and
responds to that issue in an integrated holistic way which includes her religious experience,
values and commitments. Rawls’ idea of Public Reason expects that she will be able to and
will agree to set the religious part of her identity to one side if she chooses to respond to legal
and political issues in the public square. But if she even agrees that such division of her nature
is possible, she will feel that she would lack integrity to do so. To ask her to consider dividing
her nature in this Rawlsian way, is to denigrate her dignity and to dictate another set of values
on top of those she has chosen to live and has woven through her nature.
Steven Smith makes the same point when he says it is impossible to distinguish between what
is and is not supposed to be legitimate because religious ideas and reasons are laced through so
many issues in American politics.145 While Jeremy Waldron points to the devaluation of
individual human dignity that is implicit in public reason,146 Steven Smith says, neither the
individual nor society could ever be completely sure that we had satisfactorily excluded
religious reasons from our decision making if we were minded to try. 147 It can thus be
concluded that Public Reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience, because the
devaluation of human dignity is anathema to that liberty and secondly, because it is futile to try
and exclude religious reasons from public discussion and decision-making. Hereafter in this
article, I shall refer to these as the ‘devaluation of human dignity’ and ‘futility’ reasons why
public reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience.
Finnis, Eisgruber and Sagar record a third reason why Rawlsian public reason is inconsistent
with equal liberty of conscience. They say that Rawlsian public reason would banish concern
for objective truth from all discussion in the public square.148 Their concern is that unless
overlapping consensus accidentally coincides with what was objectively the right and true
response in any public square discussion, the need for overlapping consensus would trump the
quest for the truth or the right no matter how bad the resulting compromise.149 Because this is
a concern born of the postmodern debate about whether there is any such thing as absolute
truth, I shall call this objection or inconsistency between Rawlsian public reason and equal
liberty of conscience, the ‘relativist’ inconsistency.
I have already labeled (in earlier discussions) three further inconsistencies between Rawlsian
public reason and equal liberty of conscience, representing: fourth, the ‘discrimination’ reason,
fifth, the ‘coercion’ reason and sixth, the ‘inequality’ reason. Rawlsian public reason is
inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience because it discriminates against people in society
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who are not educated, competent and confident enough to use the language of public reason
when legal and political matters arise for discussion in the public square. Rawlsian public
reason is inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience because it coerces people to leave their
religious values and beliefs behind them when they discuss anything in the public square and
Rawlsian public reason would put religious believers at an unequal disadvantage in public
square discussion and debate since it prevents religious believers from expressing themselves
in the language most familiar to them.
If equal liberty of conscience rather than public reason were the standard governing citizen
involvement in public square debate, there would be no exclusion for any of these six reasons.
That is, equal liberty of conscience would not devalue human dignity because it would allow
all citizens to participate in public square debate with and without religious reasons. There
would be no need for a futile effort to exclude religious reasons from public discussion. All
those participating in such discussion could express their vision of the good, true and right
regardless of any predetermined necessity for overlapping consensus, and in consequence,
there would be no institutionalised discrimination against any debate participants, no coercive
exclusion of any words they might choose when expressing themselves, and there would be an
overriding sense that they all had equal access to the microphone.
Where then did this anti-libertarian Rawlsian idea of public reason come from, and how could
John Rawls possibly have considered that his idea was consistent with equal liberty of
conscience? The answer is not obvious and cannot be proven beyond doubt since John Rawls
did not concede that his idea of public reason was inconsistent with equal liberty of conscience,
and he did not write anything that confessed he had changed his mind about the essential
elements of equal liberty of conscience. However, the fact that his idea of public reason is
consistent with US establishment clause jurisprudence and that the US establishment clause
jurisprudence of his ‘public reason’ years has come to constitute American orthodoxy on the
nature of equal liberty of conscience, is no small coincidence. John Rawls was steeped in
American jurisprudential orthodoxy throughout his life. Even his magnum opus, A Theory of
Justice in 1971, makes no reference to conceptions of religious liberty beyond the US. I shall
therefore conclude this part by arguing that John Rawls’ idea of public reason is inconsistent
with equal liberty of conscience precisely to the extent that his idea of public reason accords
with US establishment clause jurisprudence.
C

Rawlsian Public Reason, US Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
and Equal Liberty of Conscience

Rawls did not isolate a definition of equal liberty of conscience that he accepted as his
foundation. In A Theory of Justice, he simply wrote that ‘the question of equal liberty of
conscience was settled’150 and that ‘[i]t is one of the fixed points of our considered judgments
of justice.’151 As earlier quoted he also wrote that
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge.
They cannot take their chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine
to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.152
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But equal liberty of conscience was not absolute. It ‘is limited ... by the common interest in
public order and security’153 since from the original position, each would recognize ‘that the
disruption of [public order and security] is a danger for the liberty of all’.154
While these statements accord with those expressed in art 18 of both the UDHR and ICCPR,
Rawls’ US focus and understanding is given away in his statements above155 that the question
of equal liberty of conscience is both ‘settled’ and a ‘fixed point’ in ‘our considered judgments
of justice’. Though Rawls does not attribute the ‘fixed point metaphor’, it is a reasonably
obvious reference to the same metaphor used by Justice Robert H Jackson in his majority
opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette in 1943 as appears in the passage
below:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that not official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they not now occur to us.156

The ‘fixed point’ referred to in the Justice Jackson metaphor was the meaning of the US First
Amendment and particularly the meaning of the free exercise clause. In that case, the Supreme
Court decided that Jehovah’s Witness school children could not be forced to salute the
American flag even though the country was deeply involved in World War II.
If Rawls’ allusion in his ‘settled’ definition of equal liberty of conscience was to Justice
Jackson’s majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, then it is
ironical for Rawls on a number of fronts. First, though the case was argued under both the free
exercise and free speech clauses of the First Amendment, it was decided under the free speech
clause. The decision was that the choice of the Jehovah’s Witness school children not to salute
the flag was a matter of free speech and they were free to state their religious beliefs, in the
public square, by not saluting the flag. Second, Rawls chose to allude to the pro-free speech
majority judgment of Justice Jackson rather than the minority judgment of Justice Frankfurter
who said that freedom of religion did not allow these children to breach this West Virginia law
just because it offended their consciences. And finally, the allusion in his 1971 book is ironic
since that was the year the Supreme Court established its ‘excessive entanglement’ test in
Lemon v Kurtman, a test which further unsettled the constellation of US establishment clause
jurisprudence.
The point is that Rawls’ opinion seems to have tracked the opinion of the US Supreme Court.
For in 1971 when he published A Theory of Justice, freedom of religious speech was ascendant.
But from the year when his proofs of A Theory of Justice went to the publishers, the fixed
points began to change. Certainly Justice Hugo Black had signaled change where the
establishment clause was concerned in Everson v Board of Education in 1947, but Justice
Black’s establishment clause jurisprudence did not fully bite until Lemon v Kurtman in 1971
after A Theory of Justice went to press. Save for the school prayer cases, the eye-catching First
Amendment cases of the previous decade concerned the free exercise and free speech clauses
and liberty of the subject had been the focus of the Supreme Court’s attention.
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Perhaps the case that set Rawls to thinking about public reason was Employment Division v
Smith in 1991.157 In a sense, that case homogenised all the First Amendment clause
jurisprudence. For if government could not pass laws that dictated any measure of religion to
society, then citizens should not be granted religious exemptions from laws that did not single
them out. The Supreme Court’s decision not to allow Al Smith a religious exemption from
generally applicable drug laws so that he could smoke the hallucinogenic drug peyote in his
native American religion, was philosophically consistent with the idea that freedom of
conscience did not justify citizens breaking the law as Justice Frankfurter had said in his dissent
in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette in 1943. In the Employment Division v
Smith decision, the Supreme Court adopted the same version of neutrality towards religion that
it had developed in Establishment Clause cases since 1971, but this time, in a Free Exercise
case. This was close to a sea change for US Free Exercise jurisprudence since, beginning with
Sherbert v Verner in 1963, the Supreme Court had used the general civil rights ‘strict scrutiny’
standard to insist that government laws which burdened the free exercise of religion were
invalid unless there was no other way for government to achieve an otherwise legitimate
objective.158 Employment Division v Smith wound back the clock so that government had the
benefit of the doubt and the philosophy governing its decisions under both religion clauses
became the same. After Employment Division v Smith, the same separationist philosophy
which forbade any US government endorsement of a religious message in its administration or
legislation, required that religious practice be subject to generally applicable law unless it had
been singled out in a non-neutral manner.
Post 1971 US Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment thus turned Rawls’ 1971
understanding of equal liberty of conscience on its head. The post 1991 blended First
Amendment jurisprudence held that complete separation of church and state was an essential
part of neutral religious freedom. Even when the Supreme Court recalled Justice Burger’s
1970 statement that there should be ‘play in the joints’ between the religion clauses in 2005,159
there was the subliminal message that the neutrality required under Establishment Clause
would trump equal liberty of conscience under the Free Exercise clause since ‘there [we]re
some actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause’.160 The ‘play in the joints’ between the clauses was no longer a suggestion that the two
clauses had separate work to do in protecting religious freedom generally. It was a metaphor
to remind legislators, administrators and judges that they did not need to exclude every
religious symbol or utterance from the public square – the well established historical iconic
examples could remain because they had lost their religious message and did not prejudice the
‘American is a neutral secular state’ orthodoxy.
Accordingly, John Rawls may have been confused. There was no reference to any ‘fixed
points’ in our ‘considered judgments of justice’161 in either Political Liberalism in 1993 or ‘The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in 1997. That is because there were no fixed points any
longer. Equal liberty of conscience was in a state of flux in America. And so, in his effort to
make sense of equal liberty of conscience, John Rawls proposed Public Reason. When the
development of his reasoning is reviewed in its US political and jurisprudential context, it is
obvious that he was trying to shore up his theory so that it would continue to have explanatory
power in the future since his 1971 concept of equal liberty of conscience did not explain what
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was happening in the jurisprudence any more. The reason why he denied that his concepts of
‘equal liberty of conscience’ and Public Reason, were inconsistent, was because the US
Supreme Court still paid lip service to ‘free exercise’ which was the phrase from which Rawls
had extracted his 1971 concept of ‘equal liberty of conscience’. But even in 1971 Rawls knew
that the two phrases did not quite match which is why he preferred ‘equal liberty of conscience’.
But after Employment Division v Smith162 in 1991, his ‘theory of justice’ had begun to feel like
a farce and he tried to repair it. That is why he wrote Political Liberalism and ‘The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited’.163 They were makeshift repairs to A Theory of Justice, necessary
because the US Supreme Court’s gradual abandonment of true ‘equal liberty of conscience’
had messed up the foundations of Rawls’ original philosophical work. ‘Public reason’ was the
best idea he could find to explain what had happened. Perhaps it could also provide western
society with a tool to use to solve disagreements about ‘comprehensive doctrines’ in the future
since commitment to the old solution, ‘equal liberty of conscience’, had dissolved.
‘Public reason’ does explain contemporary American religious freedom jurisprudence. It may
not be true to the historical vision variously expressed as ‘equal liberty of conscience’, ‘free
exercise of religion’, ‘freedom of thought and conscience’, ‘freedom of religion and belief’.
But public reason does explain why religious symbols are no longer acceptable in the US public
square and why legislation that interfere with the free exercise of religion no longer need to
pass a ‘strict scrutiny’ test to be constitutionally valid.
An example of how Rawls’ idea of public reason explains the contemporary interface between
liberty of conscience and ‘pure political reasoning’, may be seen in the US Federal District
Court decision in Perry v Schwarzenegger.164 The case followed a long running political
dispute between church groups defending traditional heterosexual marriage and gay rights
activists who believed gay couples were entitled to ‘marriage status’ on equal rights grounds.
The political argument had been running for more than a decade before the case came on for
trial.
In a March 2000 voting initiative (popularly known as Proposition 22), a 61/39 majority of
California voters had authorised the enactment of a new section 308.5 in the California Family
Law Code which stated that ‘[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is recognized in
California’. That statutory amendment was held invalid under the California State Constitution
by a 4-3 majority of the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2008. 165 But that result in its
turn was overturned by a constitutional ballot proposition (Proposition 8) which amended the
California State Constitution with the same words – ‘[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is recognized in California’. That proposition had passed by a 52.2/47.8 majority after
an extensive campaign supported by the Catholic and LDS Churches which characterized the
issue as one of religious liberty.
162

494 US 872 (1990).
When Rawls gave the lectures that formed the basis for Political Liberalism (1993), he also responded to
criticism of his earlier work by Herbert Hart, Jurgen Habermas and others. Rawls specifically acknowledged the
influence of both Hart and Habermas in those lectures. He wrote that when he prepared chapter VIII of Political
Liberalism, he had revised his account of the basic liberties he had outlined in A Theory of Justice (1971) ‘in view
of HLA Hart’s criticisms’: Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) xlvi, 20. He similarly
acknowledged Jurgen Habermas in Lecture IX of that same work, observing that the only real difference between
them was between their ‘original position’ and ‘ideal discourse’ rhetorical devices and the fact that Habermas had
aspired to create a comprehensive philosophical doctrine while Rawls suggested he had only tried to explain how
justice works in the political sphere: at 372-374.
164
Case No. C 09-2292 VRW (US District Court for the Northern District of California, 4 August 2010).
165
Re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal 4th 757 (76 Cal Rptr 3d 683, 183 P 3d 384) (2008).
163

128

SHOULD ‘PUBLIC REASON’ DEVELOPED UNDER US ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE APPLY TO AUSTRALIA?

That matter came before the US Federal District Court as Perry v Schwarzenegger. Chief
Justice Vaughan Walker ruled that Proposition 8 was invalid because it violated the Due
Process and Equal Protections clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
since there was no valid secular justification for this law. He wrote:
The court defers to legislative (or in this case, popular) judgment if there is at least a debatable question
whether the underlying basis for the classification is rational … Most laws subject to rational basis easily
survive equal protection review because a legitimate reason can nearly always be found for treating
different groups in an unequal manner … [But] excluding same-sex couples from marriage is simply not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest … In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of
proponents’ case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 8 was
premised on the belief that same-sex couples are simply not as good as opposite-sex couples … Whether
that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or simply
a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship between
two men or two women, this belief is not a proper basis to legislate. 166

Justice Walker’s decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but a further
appeal to the United States Supreme Court under the name Hollingsworth v Perry167 was
declined 5-4 on the basis that the appellants did not have standing to bring suit because they
could not demonstrate a real and tangible harm.168 The Supreme Court’s standing decision in
the final appeal has technical credibility, but the underlying message in the US is that even a
majority of voters cannot vote their consciences in an election any more if religion presents as
the only rational explanation for their choice. If Justice Robert H Jackson were to continue his
1943 astronomical metaphor in the present, he might say simply that ‘the stars have changed’.
So what now for the concept of freedom of conscience, belief and religion under international
human rights instruments and particularly the UDHR and the ICCPR? Is the US Supreme
Court correct? Is Rawls’ idea of public reason, the way of the future? Has equal liberty of
conscience passed its use by date?
D

Public Reason Beyond the US?

At the heart of the reasoning of Judge Walker in Perry v Schwarzenegger is an acceptance of
the idea that public officials including judges can or should deduce and then judge the intent
of citizens and groups of citizens when they participate in the public square. US religious
liberty scholars Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry have expressed similar views. Kent
Greenawalt has said that a court would be justified in striking down a law for which the
‘ascertainable dominant reason … was a view that acts are immoral, based on a religious point
of view detached from any perspective about harm in this life’.169 Michael Perry has said that
courts are justified in banning laws ‘for which the only discernible rationale is an offending
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religious rationale’.170 Judge Walker drew ‘inference[s], amply supported by evidence171 and
‘uncloaked the most likely reason for [the] passage’172 of Proposition 8 before he decided it
was fair and just to strike it down.
It may be that this reviewable intent logic is and will remain a uniquely American phenomenon.
In countries like Australia where the doctrine of judicial review is more limited, it is difficult
to imagine that a single judge would strike down any law on moral grounds. That is because
Australian laws are protected by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty from judicial
invalidation unless they offend constitutional power. Referenda results are theoretically more
difficult to unsettle because they are the ultimate primary evidence of popular intent.
Is it possible that the occasional influence of US constitutional ideology173 in Australia might
lead to the invalidation of Australian laws on moral grounds since human rights and freedoms
can conflict with the anti-discrimination norms that have been legislated into domestic law in
accordance with Australia’s international treaty obligations?174 It is submitted that Australia’s
steadfast refusal to implement any form of Bill of Rights,175 her well established pluralism and
her track record of egalitarian thinking, do not readily comport with the idea that a majority
religious group would be able to dictate to a minority of any kind because a theoretical religious
majority believe that minority to be of less worth.
Is it conceivable that Australian courts might be required in the future, to find the reason behind
laws requiring differential treatment? Is it likely that Australian or other courts deeply
committed to the Westminster tradition including parliamentary sovereignty might try and
identify the intentions of those who framed particular laws so as to then be justified in striking
them down if they did not comport with Rawlsian Public Reason? And how would such an
attempt to identify parliamentary intent square with the idea of freedom of religious intent and
conscience?
While the High Court of Australia has often said that it does not respect the intention of the
legislature when it measures Commonwealth statutes against their constitutional enabling
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power,176 in accordance with a tradition that stretches at least to Heydon’s case in 1584177 and
reinforced in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ‘the purpose of a statute is an essential
guide to its construction’.178 But while an Australian court may use legislative intent as a guide
in the construction of a statute enacted by a sovereign parliament, since Australia has
steadfastly set its face against the enactment of any form of Bill of Rights179 which might enable
judicial review of legislation against human rights norms, it is unlikely that any statute enacted
for comprehensive doctrinal reasons would be struck down on those grounds.
Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have shown that ‘religious freedom is consistent with [religious]
establishment’ and certainly with ‘establishment in its modern, diluted, symbolic form’.180
They agree with the author that the idea that establishment is inconsistent with religious
freedom is primarily an ‘American understanding’.181 They observe that ‘any argument that
establishment is discriminatory rests primarily on the symbolic effect of the link with state
institutions’;182 ‘that there is no reason to take the … words of US First Amendment, nor the
way the [US] courts have interpreted them, as embodying either necessary or universal truths
about the nature of establishment’,183 and they are certain that ‘[t]he ICCPR … does not …
prohibit a state religion that acts noncoercively’.184
They further state that ‘the [UN] Human Rights Committee has acknowledged that
[establishment] arrangements that do not restrict religious liberty are possible’185 and that ‘mild
forms of state preference for one religion over another do not violate the [European]
Convention [on Human Rights]’.186 They have also found that an establishment of religion
does not inherently alienate those who do not belong to the established church,187 or that an
establishment of religion almost always leads to inequality between religions. 188 But they are
at their most emphatic when they state that the claim that a liberal state must be neutral if
religious freedom is to be respected, is a mirage.189 That is because there is always some
established orthodoxy in a liberal state190 and the idea of neutrality is dangerous because it
masks that reality. They quote Robert George for the proposition that ‘secularism is itself …

176

For eg, see Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (Engineers Case) (1920) 28 CLR
129, [151] (Isaacs J); Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (Bank Nationalisation Case) (1948) 76 CLR 1,
[186] (Latham CJ); and Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (ANA Case) (1945) 71 CLR 29,
[70] (Rich J).
177
Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a; 76 ER 637.
178
George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (6th ed,
Federation Press, 2014) [17.59].
179
See above n 175.
180
Ahdar and Leigh, above n 1, 654. See also generally 651-63.
181
Ibid 651-54.
182
Ibid 655.
183
Ibid 657.
184
Ibid 658.
185
Ibid 659.
186
Ibid 660.
187
Ibid 663-71.
188
Ibid 671-77.
189
Ibid 677-80.
190
Ibid 677, ironically citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 193-95 because he says that ‘The principles of any
reasonable political conception must impose restrictions on permissible comprehensive views, and the basic
institutions those principles require inevitably encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude
them altogether’. Ahdar and Leigh also state that ‘[a] secular, liberal state is not “neutral”. It tolerates religions
on its own terms. Religious liberty is always exercised in the shadow of establishments whether conventionally
religious or not’: at 637.
131

(2015) 17 UNDALR

[a] competing worldview … [or] sectarian doctrine’191 and affirm that ‘believers may feel
equally alienated by a secular, political regime that extirpates religious symbolism and practice
from the public square’.192
Ahdar and Leigh conclude that ‘US First Amendment caselaw and doctrine’193 have distorted
a correct or proper understanding of religious freedom. ‘[O]ther countries, … international
law, and … the ECHR cases demonstrate … that establishment’194 does not necessarily limit
religious liberty and the disestablishment of religion is no sure guarantee that religious liberty
has been maximized through neutrality.
The bottom line is then that religious establishment is not a devil to be exorcised from every
liberal state.

IV

CONCLUSION

US establishment clause jurisprudence has been through a number of changes. While there is
debate about whether the clause was originally intended to protect the state religious
establishments which existed at the time of federation or to erect an impregnable wall between
religion generally and the state, the establishment clause has come to mean that government
cannot do anything which would endorse any religious idea or suggest that a non-religiousbeliever was an outsider. That idea of religious freedom is inconsistent with the nature of
religious freedom expressed in international human rights instruments including the UDHR,
the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights, all of which proceed from the
premise that an establishment of religion is not inconsistent with religious freedom.
John Rawls’ idea of public reason presents as a generally applicable insight into the nature of
liberal democracy, but when its evolution is tracked against the First Amendment jurisprudence
of the US Supreme Court, it becomes apparent that Rawls developed his idea of public reason
to explain US Supreme Court First Amendment orthodoxy post 1991. Originally, John Rawls
was committed to a vision of equal liberty of conscience which was constitutionally fixed in
terms consistent with international freedom of religion norms. As the US Supreme Court
moved away from their civil rights era strict scrutiny protection of human rights, Rawls adapted
his ideal vision of justice to explain what the US Supreme Court said worked best in liberal
democratic practice.
Neither US Supreme Court establishment clause jurisprudence nor Rawlsian public reason
ideally protects equal liberty of conscience. That is a problem since the US holds itself out as
the world’s instructor when it comes to the protection of human rights generally and religious
freedom in particular.195 Legislators, administrators and law and religion scholars need to
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recognise the qualitative differences in religious freedom models that are on offer because they
have a large impact on the long term economic strength of their economies196 and the quality
of life of their religious minorities. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh have also demonstrated that when
it comes to constitutional freedom of religion, the neutrality used to justify separation is a
mirage.197 There is always an established orthodoxy which alienates someone. State
transparency that recognizes its own agenda but strives for inclusion is more likely to accord
with international religious freedom norms.
The existence of established orthodoxies raises larger philosophical problems if public reason
is to be the new gold standard for public discourse in modern liberal democracies. Public reason
is anti-democratic to the extent that it suppresses freedom of conscience and speech. To insist
that all discourse in the public square be conducted in the language of public reason is to
suppress the freedom of speech of anyone that could not speak that way. Public reason thus
stands to subvert the freedom of speech of the less educated and religious in a liberal democratic
society.198 To the extent that public reason would dilute or remove anyone’s entitlement to
speak in the marketplace, it is discriminatory and coercive.199 Public reason may assist some
members of society to articulate their views, but it should not directly or indirectly deny that
right to others for that would deny those members of our society their human dignity.200
Finnis, Eisgruber and Sagar and Smith have demonstrated that public reason would banish all
concern for the existence of objective truth from the public square since the suggestion that it
exists amounts to the assertion of an inadmissible comprehensive doctrine.201 Steven D Smith
has agreed202 and observed additionally that such theoretical banishment is ironical and futile;
ironical since the US framers were obsessed about and committed to objective truth when they
debated the US Constitution,203 and futile because it is almost impossible to detect a ‘truth
concern’ in a human being,204 though Judge Vaughan Walker apparently succeeded in the
Schwartzenegger case.205
In concluding, I submit that John Rawls’ ‘idea of public reason’ was fashioned and developed
in the context of the US Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. I have
suggested that the evolution of his thought closely tracks that jurisprudence and shows no
significant influence from other analyses of religious freedom. Though he responded to Hart
and Habermas in his later work, he was responding not to their concern about his dilution of
religious liberty, but to his general account of basic liberties and to the different rhetorical
devices that they had used.206 I submit that Rawls’ ideology is subversive of freedom of
conscience and speech as established in international human rights instruments and as accepted
responded to that US categorisation with disappointment <http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/pressreleases/uscirf-places-india-watch-list>.
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outside the US. I further submit that the understanding of freedoms of conscience and speech
that western society has achieved following centuries of bloodshed are worth retaining and
protecting. This article was written to draw out what appear to be inconsistencies between
these essential human freedoms and Rawls’ public reason ideology. Freedom of conscience
and speech provide a safer standard for human discourse in the public square than public
reason. That is because the overlapping consensus we achieve when we consider all the
competing views and their supporting ideologies is a much more durable and worthwhile
consensus than the pretended consensus which results following the suppression of the views
of large sections of our communities.
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